The disputable presumption ‘that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act’ applies in both civil and criminal cases
Intent, being a condition of the mind, may be averred or alleged generally (see Section 5, Rule 8, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure).
The alleged intent must be proved. If the act is alleged to have been done with intent to commit a crime or felony, it is essential that the facts and circumstances showing the existence of the intent must be proven.
“[A] cardinal doctrine of criminal law, founded in natural justice, is, that it is the intention with which an act was done that constitutes its criminality.
“The intent and the act must both concur, to constitute the crime. ‘Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[I]f it be alleged that the prisoner [or accused] cut the prosecutor, with intent to murder or disable him, and to do him some great bodily harm, and the evidence be merely of an intent to prevent a lawful arrest, it is a fatal variance; unless it appears that he intended the injury alleged, for the purpose of preventing the arrest” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[T]he intent must therefore be proved, as well as the other material facts in the indictment [or criminal charge].
“The proof may be either by evidence, direct or indirect, tending to establish the fact; or by inference of law from other facts proved” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“For though it is a maxim of law… that every person is to be presumed innocent until he is proved to be guilty; yet it is a rule equally sound, that every sane person must be supposed to intend that which is the ordinary and natural consequence of his own purposed act” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“Therefore, ‘where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, there the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant; and, in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent’” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
The disputable presumption “that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act” applies in both civil and criminal cases (Section 3, Rule 131 (c), 2019 Rules on Evidence).
“Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[W]hen one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended but was accidental, it is to be presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[Since] no man may lawfully kill another, and intentional homicides are in general the result of malice and evil passions… in every case of intentional homicide, not otherwise explained by its circumstances, it is… to be presumed that the slayer was actuated by malice; and… the burden of proof is on him to show that the [act] was not; [and] that the act was either justifiable or excusable” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“In the proof of intention, it is not always necessary that the evidence should apply directly to the particular act, with the commission of which the party is charged; for the unlawful intent in the particular case may well be inferred from a similar intent, proved to have existed in other transactions done before or after that time” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[In] the trial of a person for maliciously shooting another, the question being whether it was done by accident or design, evidence was admitted to prove that the prisoner [or accused] intentionally shot at the prosecutor at another time, about a quarter of an hour distant from the shooting charged in the indictment” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[U]pon an indictment for sending a threatening letter, the meaning and intent of the writer may be shown by other letters written, or verbal declarations made, before and after the letter in question.”
“[I]n cases of homicide, evidence of former hostility… on the part of the prisoner against the deceased, are admissible in proof of malice” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“In regard to the distance of time between the principal fact in issue and the collateral facts proposed to be shown in proof of the intention, so far as it affects the admissibility of the evidence, no precise rule has been laid down, but the question rests in the discretion of the judge” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“Evidence of facts transacted three months before, and one month afterwards, has been received to prove guilty knowledge in a charge of forgery…”
“It has been held, that, in the case of subsequent facts, they must appear to have some connection with the principal fact charged” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[I]n the proof of an intent to defraud a particular person, it is not necessary to show that the prisoner [or accused] had that particular person in his mind at the time; it is sufficient, if the act done would have the effect of defrauding him; for the law presumes that the party intended to do that which was the natural consequence of his act” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
“[I]n an indictment for uttering forged bank-notes, with intent to defraud the bank, the jury (court) found that the intent was to defraud whoever might take the notes, but that the prisoner [or accused] had in fact no intention of defrauding the bank… the conviction was held right;… in such cases, [he] intended to defraud the person who would have to pay the bill or note, if it were genuine…” (A treatise on the Law of Evidence, Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Harriman).
